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Title VII Blues
Black Workers in White Unions. By William B. Gould. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1977. Pp. 506. $20.00
Reviewed by Robert N. Covingtont
Professor Gould has written exactly the book one would expect from
him: articulate, persuasive, impatient with doctrines and remedies
that would compromise in any way the opportunity of blacks to share
in the bounty of the American economy. Issued two days after Supreme
Court decisions' that reject much of what the author advocates re-
garding the treatment of seniority under Title VII, 2 the book could
well prove to be the opening volley in a battle for congressional
reversal of those holdings. Whether or not it serves that function, the
book is required reading for all those who seek to understand the stance
of the Title VII plaintiff's bar.
For this is a plaintiff's book. The stance taken by organized labor on
racial discrimination is characterized in the Introduction as "am-
bivalent," 3 "unsympathetic," 4 reflective "not merely [of] the attempt
to mislead but also [of] considerable naivete." The attitudes of critics
more sympathetic than Professor Gould to union conduct, such as
Derek Bok and John Dunlop, are labeled "pernicious." We are thus
given fair warning: though this book was written by William Gould,
professor of law, scholar, and analyst, it was written also by William
Gould, plaintiff's counsel in Detroit Edison7 and a veteran of other
major Title VII battles.8
t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
I. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977); United Air
Lines v. Evans, 97 S. Ct. 1885 (1977).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).





7. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd and remanded
sub nora. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975).
8. In addition to being involved in litigation, Professor Gould served at one time as
a consultant to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). His work there
centered on seniority issues and is described in part at pp. 72-74.
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The warning is needed. The exposition of doctrine is never inac-
curate, save as intervening decisions may have made it so, but there are
emphases and omissions that would be troubling if the book purported
to be wholly analytical and objective. The first chapter, for example,
is headed "Overview of Constitutional Law in Race Relations." It is
devoted to school desegregation cases. Washington v. Davis,9 in which
the Supreme Court held that the Constitution forbids only intentional
employment discrimination by local governments, not unintended dis-
criminatory impacts, is never mentioned. (There is a passing reference
to the decision some seventy pages afterward.10 ) Later, the relief af-
forded by the Detroit Edison trial court is applauded vigorously in the
text," while the reader must flip over to the footnotes printed at the
end of the book to discover that this portion of the decree was signif-
icantly modified by the Sixth Circuit.' 2
Part I of Black Workers is an exposition of the substantive and
procedural law of employment discrimination, with greatest emphasis
on Title VII. That this portion of the book would be obsolescent on
the day of publication was very nearly inevitable. Any writer publish-
ing a sizeable work in this field risks the appearance of major new
opinions between the time the manuscript goes to the publisher and
the day the book comes from the press. Even so, Professor Gould has
suffered more than most. Two days before his book was released, the
Supreme Court issued two opinions13 interpreting section 703(h) of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Act), the provision that makes compliance
with a bona fide seniority system an affirmative defense to discrimina-
tion charges.' 4
Seniority systems often prove to be stumbling blocks for blacks
seeking advancement, particularly for those of age thirty and over.
They are also of great importance to many unions. Hence, these sys-
tems can be of pivotal importance in litigation between minority
9. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
10. P. 102.
11. See, e.g., pp. 83-87, 107-08, 147, 257.
12. The Sixth Circuit nullified the district court's award of punitive damages and set
out more restrictive guidelines for computing awards of back pay, seniority, and job
transfer upon remand. 515 F.2d at 308-10, 314-17. The trial court had also awarded relief
to craftsmen "who had been deterred from applying" for jobs at Detroit Edison because
of the company's discriminatory reputation in the community. The Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, stated that "there was no allegation that [Edison's discriminatory] reputation actually
deterred anyone from applying." Id. at 312. The Supreme Court recently held that in-
cumbent employees who are deterred from applying for promotion or transfer by aware-
ness of discriminatory company attitudes may be entitled to relief, but the opinion adds
that proof is likely to be difficult. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97
S. Ct. 1843, 1868-69 (1977).
13. See note 1 supra (citing cases).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
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groups and unions. Well over half of Chapter Four of Black Workers,
the chapter outlining the circumstances under which unions and em-
ployers are liable for Title VII violations, deals with seniority prob-
lems. The discussion relies primarily on circuit court opinions, which
had uniformly invalidated facially neutral seniority systems that per-
petuated the impact of pre-Act racial discrimination. In the recent
Teamsters decision, the Supreme Court announced a contrary rule.16
Though it acknowledged that section 703(h) protects only "bona fide"
seniority systems that incorporate no intentionally discriminatory dif-
ferences in treatment,' 7 it rejected the contention that "bona fide"
excludes any system that perpetuates pre-Title VII discrimination:
To accept the argument would require us to hold that a seniority
system becomes illegal simply because it allows the full exercise
of the pre-Act seniority rights of employees of a company that
discriminated before Title VII was enacted. It would place an
affirmative obligation on the parties to the seniority agreement to
subordinate those rights in favor of the claims of pre-Act dis-
criminatees without seniority. The consequence would be a perver-
sion of the congressional purpose. We cannot accept the invitation
to disembowel § 703(h) by reading the words "bona fide" as the
Government would have us do. Accordingly, we hold that an other-
wise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful
under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act dis-
crimination. Congress did not intend to make it illegal for em-
ployees with vested seniority rights to continue to exercise those
rights, even at the expense of pre-Act discriminatees.' s
Moreover, in a companion case, the Court held that a "discriminatory
act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equiva-
lent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was
passed."' 0 Thus, although such a past act might be "relevant back-
ground evidence" of currently disputed practices, standing alone it
was "merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal
consequences." 20
That Professor Gould will disapprove of both holdings seems clear.
At one point he argues:
15. The leading case is Quarles v. Philip Morris, 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
Professor Gould also relies heavily on Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). See pp. 74-77, 80-85.
16. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977).
17. Id. at 1863.
18. Id. at 1863-64 (footnotes omitted).
19. United Air Lines v. Evans, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 1889 (1977).
20. Id.
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The only defense for a system which jeopardizes the black worker's
assuming his rightful place is business necessity. Quite clearly, the
erosion of white seniority rights, while posing serious human-
relations problems which might conceivably erupt into violence
or sabotage, has never constituted a business necessity within the
meaning of Title VII.21
The trouble with this argument is that it equates the "plus points"
white workers acquire by virtue of seniority with the "plus points"
derived from test scores and diplomas, the use of which by employers
was limited by the Griggs decision 22 to instances of demonstrated
business necessity. Section 703(h) is the source of both the testing and
seniority defenses; its language juxtaposes permission to employ bona
fide seniority systems and permission to utilize professionally devel-
oped, nondiscriminatory ability tests.23 Because of this juxtaposition of
language, Professor Gould would seem to have a good point in saying
that test scores and seniority credits should be similarly treated. But
there are two compelling reasons to the contrary.
First, while the two defenses are codified in the same section, they
appear in the statute as the result of separate legislative struggles. The
testing defense was championed by Senator Tower of Texas to counter
a ruling by a hearing officer for the Illinois Fair Employment Com-
mission.24 The hearing officer had concluded that a preemployment
intelligence test used by Motorola, Inc., placed members of minority
groups at a "competitive disadvantage" and thus might be unlawful.
Tower argued that employers should be free to use such tests as a
means of ensuring the competency of workers. The language pertaining
to the seniority defense in section 703(h), on the other hand, resulted
from arguments by Senator Hill of Alabama (an opponent of the
statute) that white workers would lose "vested" seniority rights be-
cause of Title VII.2 -
Second, and more fundamentally, the two defenses serve different
21. P. 81.
22. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23. Section 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), provides that
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is
not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex
or national origin.
24. See 110 CONG. REc. 13492-93 (1964).
25. See pp. 68-71.
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functions. Education and testing credentials, properly used, can offer
an employer the means to structure a more efficient and productive
work force. Seniority can serve a similar purpose by awarding promo-
tion or job retention to the more experienced, but it does not neces-
sarily lead to such an outcome. Moreover, seniority systems limit-at
times severely-a management's privilege to make decisions about rela-
tive employee merit. No surprise, then, that it is the union, not the
company, that seeks seniority systems.2 6 It seeks them for the purpose
of protecting the worker's "investment" of time in his job. If one
deprives management of the privilege of utilizing tests that discriminate
against blacks but that do not (demonstrably) contribute to selecting
the best workers, it is hard to argue that management is much worse
off than before. But if one deprives a white worker of his "rank"
within a seniority system by merging it with a seniority system into
which blacks have been segTegated, that worker's position is at least
potentially worsened. The injustice to the black worker is equally grave
in each instance, but in the case of testing, one can remedy the in-
equity while still permitting the most appropriate use of that device.
In the case of seniority, however, remedying the inequity requires tak-
ing away a level of arguably legitimate27 protection.
Though Professor Gould's view that seniority systems perpetuating
pre-Act (or pre-charge) discrimination are unlawful has not prevailed,
the Court has taken a position much like his on the extent to which
the federal district courts may order reform of seniority credits as a
remedy for post-Act discrimination.2 8 And the remedy-centered chapters
(notably Chapters Five and Six in Part I and Twelve and Thirteen in
Part III) are the best of Black Workers. The former chapters provide a
quick review of the content of several important decrees in litigation
between minorities and unions.29 The latter chapters analyze how half
a dozen or so decrees have worked in practice. The most detailed treat-
26. The importance of such systems varies, of course, from industry to industry. In
soeic construction situations, the hiring hall is far more significant to members as a
source of job security. For the bulk of manufacturing, transport, and merchandising
workers, however, seniority benefits-protection from lay-off, eligibility for promotion,
first choice on overtime demands-are much of what the union has to sell. For some
older workers, certain seniority issues may be even more important in collective bargain-
ing than are wage rate issues.
27. "Legitimacy" is hard to judge in this context. Few white workers with pre-Act
seniority credits are likely to have participated in setting up such systems, and even those
who did are unlikely to have had racist motivations. Nonetheless, insistence on main-
taining preferential seniority treatment has racial overtones.
28. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1873-75
(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (discussed at pp. 78-82, 109-10).
29. Pp. 99-159.
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ment is of the Seattle building trades decree,30 on which we have heard
from Professor Gould before.31 His conclusions are that aggressive,
carefully tailored judicial decrees can accomplish a great deal, but that
most minority plaintiffs have not received adequate relief. 32 This
inadequacy he attributes to judicial reluctance to interfere in matters
that are the subjects of collective bargaining (a carry-over, perhaps,
from attitudes developed in National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)33
litigation, in which deference to judgments of the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) is traditional); inadequate monitoring of
compliance with decrees (whether by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) or by special masters); bad judgment by
the EEOC and the Department of Labor in working out settlement
decrees in major industry-wide cases; and complexities inherent in the
workforce structures of many industries. The author provides illustra-
tions of each of these factors, most often in the context of the con-
struction trades, which are the principal focus of Chapters Ten through
Thirteen. The illustrations are well chosen and convincing. The case
for detailed provisions for changes in membership requirements, over-
haul of apprenticeship programs, and close supervision of compliance
with decrees is overwhelming.34
The single chapter dealing with remedy and enforcement problems
in nonconstruction occupations, Chapter Fourteen, is disappointing in
comparison. Only the UAW receives anything like the depth of treat-
ment accorded the building trades. There are, however, valuable in-
sights into the role of internal union politics in the industrial unions-
insights that explain in part the lack of black employee enthusiasm for
merging minority locals with their white counterparts and the dif-
ficulty blacks have experienced in getting started up the ladder of in-
ternational officeholding. Particularly good is the analysis of how a well-
organized black caucus can serve the interests of its members, not only
30. United States v. Local 86, Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D.
Wash. 1970), afj'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
31. Gould, The Seattle Building Trades Order: The First Comprehensive Relief
Against Employment Discrimination in the Construction Industry, 26 STAN. L. REV. 773
(1974).
32. Professor Gould is at his best in explaining why the initial decrees, requiring dis-
semination of information to prospective black workers, new standards for apprenticeship
training, and the creation of an advisory committee to coordinate and monitor progress,
had to be strengthened from time to time in response to inertia as well as to active op-
position from union leaders. See pp. 345-62; cf. EEOC v. Local 14, Int'l Union of Oper-
ating Engineers, 553 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 1977) (remanding for revision sweeping district
court order and admonishing lower court that proper decree "should interfere with the
defendant's operations no more than is necessary").
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
34. Pp. 281-362.
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by its own activity, but by providing a forum within which black leaders
can surface and obtain experience.3 5
Chapters Seven through Nine continue an ongoing debate over the
proper roles of the NLRB and of arbitrators in the struggle against
discrimination. Professor Gould argues that the NLRB should be more
vigorous in denying certification to discriminatory unions36 and more
imaginative in applying unfair labor practice doctrine to racist union
conduct.37 His criticisms and suggestions regarding arbitration center
on two points. First, Professor Gould urges that arbitrators should be
more aggressive in employing Title VII doctrine and remedies.3s Many
arbitrators now do so when interpreting contracts that include anti-
discrimination clauses, but relatively few are willing to take the extra
step of reading such a clause into a contract. Second, Professor Gould
argues for allowing third-party intervention in the handling of some
grievances, principally those involving minority group members.39 The
third parties important to his thesis would be civil rights groups, al-
though other possible third parties are mentioned (in the case of
wildcat strikes, for example).4 0 This proposed inroad on the principle
of exclusive representation of a bargaining unit's members by a single
labor organization is unlikely to be greeted with enthusiasm by most
in the field. Not only would it create the possibility that unions might
take civil rights grievances less seriously, passing the buck to a probably
less experienced representative, but it could also introduce into arbitra-
tion proceedings issues foreign to the original contract negotiations.
Whether arbitrators would find such disputes susceptible to traditional
procedures and doctrines is open to doubt.41
The assault on the exclusivity principle continues in Chapter Nine,
Gould's critique of Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Organization.42 He argues that the decision unduly restricts
the opportunity for workers represented by a recognized union to en-
35. See, e.g., pp. 388-93 (discussion of Chrysler situation).
36. Pp. 163-66. The NLRB has recently moved in the opposite direction, indicating
that it will no longer provide a special procedure for handling objections to certification
based on discriminatory practices. See Handy Andy Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M.
1354 (1977).
37. Pp. 178-206.
38. Pp. 212-19, 239-42.
39. Pp. 229-34.
40. Pp. 231-32.
41. Professor Gould responds to similar criticisms at pp. 233-34. In the final analysis,
only trying the Gould prescription would allow us to determine whether the disruption
of arbitration would be, as he urges, minimal. Intervention is, of course, allowed in a
large number of judicial settings as well as in NLRB proceedings. Studies of attendant
problems in those settings might be helpful.
42. 420 U.S. 50 (1975), rev'g Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485
F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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gage in concerted extra-union activity protesting management practices
that are the subject of union negotiations or grievance handling. Under
Emporium Capwell, an employer may, without violating the NLRA,
discharge employees who continue to act in this fashion after being
warned of the possibility of discharge. 43 The author suggests that Con-
gress and the courts have followed too slavishly the guiding principles
of exclusivity and majority rule.44 One must agree that the combination
of the two principles in the Taft-Hartley Act4 5 and its interpretations
can prejudice the interests of minorities within unions. The sug-
gestions offered by Black Workers for modifying these principles do
not, however, seem particularly attractive. The argument that the
NLRA should protect from discharge individuals who persist in extra-
union protests unless their union can demonstrate that it has been
"pressing to do its utmost on the racial issue" 46 has been roundly con-
demned.47 Similarly unconvincing are Professor Gould's suggestions
for maintaining sufficient black presence in internal union affairs
when a black local is merged into a larger white local. 48 He mentions,
for example, apportioning union offices between the races. 40 Some
courts have done this on a purely transitional basis when merging
formerly racially segregated locals.50 But a union officer kept in his
post by virtue of judicial decree seems unlikely to have the clout or
prestige needed for truly effective representation.
To differ with a few specifics in Black Workers is not, however, to
counsel inactivity. There are analogies, both in government and in the
private sector, to the problem of remedying underrepresentation of
minorities, and means have been devised for protecting the interests of
outnumbered classes and groups. One regrets, for example, that Pro-
fessor Gould did not explore the potential of cumulative voting require-
ments in elections for local union governing boards. 5' Admittedly,
laws requiring these or similar devices would be an additional inter-
ference in union affairs, and such intrusions are never achieved with-
out political difficulty. But interference that aims to ensure that
43. See 420 U.S. at 56, 60-70.
44. See, e.g., pp. 255-67.
45. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 & 29 U.S.C.).
46. P. 263.
47. See, e.g., 87 HARv. L. Rav. 656 (1974) (criticizing court of appeals opinion in
Emporium Capwell). The arguments against such protection are that alternative remedies
are available, that permitting this sort of self-help can undermine collective bargaining,
and that the standard of review of NLRB action adopted by the court of appeals would




51. He mentions one instance in which it was rejected by a court. Pp. 131-32.
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minority groups within unions have the opportunity to seek political
power might well be more tolerable than the more direct interference
one finds in manning tables, numerical membership goals, and the
like. Cumulative voting would also offer a facially neutral means of
addressing the problem, one that could be used not only by racial
minorities, but also by women, groups speaking foreign languages, or
even Republicans. Such a provision, applicable to locals of one hundred
or more active members, added to Title I of the Landrum-Griffin Act,5 2
should be workable. But despite Professor Gould's inattention to such
alternative reforms, one must be grateful to him for emphasizing that
short-term gains realized by minority group members in litigation must
find a solid base in the internal structure of the union movement in
order to endure.
The principal diagnosis offered by Black Workers is clear: America's
minority workers have made progress, but it has been too little progress,
and too slow in coming. More is urgently needed. Because this is so
clearly what one would have expected from the author in the first place,
there is a danger that it may not receive the attention it merits. The
diagnosis offered in Black Workers is compelling. The prescriptions are
less so. Nonetheless, the book succeeds in identifying many of the
necessary ingredients for more permanent solutions to black workers'
problems: devices to ensure political power for the minorities within
unions; procedures to keep the requirements of judicial decrees in the
forefront of future planning by union defendants, rather than sidelined
as problems that one hopes will disappear; more apt administration by
agencies fighting employment discrimination; greater sophistication on
the part of blacks now holding office in the organized labor movement;
and, always, continued pressure by individual as well as governmental
plaintiffs to prevent principles of liability and concepts of remedy from
freezing into inflexibility.
Black Workers is not always easy reading. There are awkward pas-
sages and production flaws53 as well as substantively troublesome or
incomplete sections. 54 But the spirit of the book, its forthright advocacy
of needed reforms, and its vivid descriptions of past successes and
failures under Title VII more than compensate for its drawbacks. On
balance, reading it is a rewarding and provocative experience, one that
should be shared by all practitioners in the labor relations field.
52. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (1959) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
53. See, e.g., p. 68 (referring to Senator Lister Hill of Alabama as "Senator Lester
Hill"); p. 255 ("Justice Marshall's view that an employer would not persist in following
a pattern of discrimination and class actions and the potential for repeated misbehavior
in an endless variety of circumstances.")
54. See, e.g., p. 398 supra.
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Denial of Justice: Criminal Process in the United States. By Lloyd L.
Weinreb. New York: Free Press, 1977. Pp. xi, 177. $12.95.
Reviewed by Phillip E. Johnsont
According to the dust jacket of Denial of Justice,' Professor Lloyd
Weinreb has been a federal prosecutor in the District of Columbia,
a United States Commissioner in Boston, and a "first-hand observer
of the French criminal process." Evidently Weinreb, like many other
Americans, liked what he saw in France better than what he saw in
Washington and Boston. The argument of Denial of Justice is, quite
simply, that the adversary system of criminal prosecution as we know
it in the United States should be replaced with a new system based
on continental European procedures and institutions.
Weinreb's premise, as the title of the book implies, is that our ex-
isting ways do not work and cannot be made to work. He blames
much of our failure on the fact that we rely on a single institution,
the police, both to maintain order in the community and to investi-
gate crimes in preparation for trial. He argues that no single agency
can perform both functions adequately, and that the very quality that
is most useful to the police in their peacekeeping function-the ability
to respond instantly and instinctively in emergency situations-makes
them unsuited to conducting investigations that are both thorough
and fair. The policeman is trained and equipped to deal with crime
as it happens, not to collect all the evidence whether or not favorable
to the prosecution, nor to interview the witnesses without violating
their rights, nor to make an unbiased determination of the facts.
Misuse of the police is not the only fault that Weinreb finds with
American criminal justice. He notes, as have many others, that our
courts tolerate enormous and seemingly pointless delays, that pretrial
screening of charges is often perfunctory, that we rely to an enormous
and indefensible extent on bargained pleas of guilty, and that our
jury trials take the adversary system to the point of absurdity. The
t Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1977)
[hereinafter cited by page number only].
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system, moreover, is constructed so as to maximize lawyers' opportuni-
ties to delay, manipulate, and obscure the issues to be decided. It is
not a system anyone would design if his object were to get at the truth
as expeditiously as possible consistent with protecting the rights of
the defendant and the witnesses.
The solution Weinreb proposes for the shortcomings of American
criminal justice practice is a wholesale shift to procedures borrowed
from continental Europe. The police would continue to patrol the
streets, respond to emergencies, make arrests, and conduct immediate
on-the-scene investigations of crimes. Further investigation, including
interviewing witnesses, collecting evidence, and conducting lineups
and scientific tests would be the task of an investigating magistrate
invoking the authority of legal process rather than the threat of force.
The magistrate's investigation would replace existing pretrial pro-
cedures, including indictment, preliminary hearing, and arraignment.
The magistrate's interviewing of witnesses would take place in a formal
hearing, far removed from the intimidating atmosphere of the police
station. Defense counsel and the prosecutor might be present, but the
magistrate would control the proceedings and counsel would be lim-
ited to respectfully correcting his errors and making sure nothing was
forgotten. Upon completing his investigation, the magistrate would
prepare a thorough report and find the defendant guilty or not guilty.
A defendant found guilty by the magistrate would stand formally
accused and have a trial before a mixed panel consisting of a pre-
siding judge, two lawyers, and seven lay persons. The presiding judge,
having studied the magistrate's file, would summarize the evidence,
call the witnesses, and generally take the leading role in the proceed-
ings. Other members of the court would ask questions and participate
freely, unlike our mute jurors. The prosecutor and defense counsel
would play a subordinate and supplementary role, much as at the
magistrate's hearing.
Much of what Professor Weinreb would like to accomplish is ap-
pealing. Our criminal justice procedures would seem as absurd to
us as they do to foreigners if we were not so used to them. It some-
times appears that, to an American, a fair trial is one in which the
defendant has a reasonable chance of escaping conviction no matter
how overwhelming is the case against him. We purport to revere the
privilege against self-incrimination but openly coerce guilty pleas by
rewarding those who plead guilty with more lenient sentences. We
purport to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt but unashamedly
rely on the testimony of confessed criminals who have been promised
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immunity from prosecution or leniency in sentencing. Our appellate
courts reverse convictions for trivial reasons but leave sentencing to
the unguided discretion of trial judges. One could go on and on. Noth-
ing could be healthier for the American criminal bar than to immerse
itself in the study of comparative criminal procedure and thus dis-
cover that ours is not the only or even the best way of doing things.
In this respect Denial of Justice may perform a real service.
Yet Weinreb does not make a convincing case that American crim-
inal procedure is wholly without redeeming virtues, or that the de-
fects that it assuredly has would be materially improved by importing
new institutions from continental Europe. There are three basic de-
fects in his argument. First, his criticism of American practices is over-
simplified to the point of being unfair. Second, he fails to examine
whether the faults that he identifies in the American system are also
to be found in other countries that follow Anglo-American rather than
Continental procedures. Finally, Weinreb holds out as an alterna-
tive to the American system not Continental procedure as it currently
works out in practice, but rather an idealized description of how the
Continental system is meant to work. The reader is told next to noth-
ing about how the institutions and procedures Weinreb advocates
have worked out when they have been tried in practice.
In describing the faults of American criminal procedure, Weinreb
has understandably tried to avoid becoming bogged down in detail,
with the unfortunate result that he gives ample ammunition to any
well-informed defender of the status quo who wishes to charge him
with oversimplification. His argument about the unsuitability of the
police for criminal investigation, which is crucial to the thesis of the
book, appears to imply that serious crimes are investigated by patrol-
men on the beat, although Weinreb clearly knows better. In fact,
the specialist detective squads that perform criminal investigations
in most American police departments are not responsible for general
peace keeping or order enforcing. Besides the police, there exist other
agencies, such as the F.B.I. (which Weinreb briefly mentions), that
specialize in investigation. It is not uncommon for a local district
attorney in the United States to have a staff of investigators supple-
menting the police. Although Weinreb makes clear that investigation
by a magistrate should be superior to investigation by a patrolman,
he does not explain why it is superior to investigation by the F.B.I.
or Scotland Yard.
Again, Weinreb argues that pretrial proceedings in the United
States are not worth much, to support his proposal that they be re-
408
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placed by hearings before an investigating magistrate. Summing up
the process of prosecutorial screening, indictment, preliminary hear-
ing, and arraignment, he states disparagingly that "since the initial
proceedings accomplish nothing, no one takes them seriously; since
no one takes them seriously, they accomplish nothing."2 This sweep-
ing dismissal may be justified with respect to some localities, but my
experience with California pretrial criminal practice persuades me
that this need not be so. As I have observed it, prosecutorial screen-
ing is a rigorous process that weeds out a great many cases that the
police would like to charge as felonies, and preliminary hearings are
often full-fledged adversarial contests. In Professor Weinreb's home
state of Massachusetts, defendants at preliminary hearings have exten-
sive rights to cross examine witnesses and to put on affirmative de-
fenses, and the prosecutor must satisfy the magistrate that he has suf-
ficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict for the defense measured
by the reasonable doubt standard.3 This hardly sounds like a worth-
less proceeding.
Weinreb's description of American criminal process is equally cen-
sorious and one-sided when he discusses the trial. Undoubtedly some
features of our system encourage counsel to attempt to manipulate
and mislead, and we treat jurors like idiot children. But Weinreb
himself concedes that the tricks of adversary practice ordinarily do
not govern the outcome; indeed, we have seen again and again in
the past decade of social conflict that juries can set aside prejudices
and publicity and decide cases on the evidence presented in court.
The idea of having a strong trial judge take control of the conduct
of the proceedings away from counsel and then sit with the jury and
direct its deliberations is an appealing one-until one thinks of some
of our more biased and domineering judges.
One charge that Weinreb does not level at the American criminal
justice system is that it has a tendency to convict the innocent. On
the contrary he asserts, based on what evidence I do not know, that
conviction of the innocent is at an irreducible minimum. 4 This con-
cession is surprising in the midst of an otherwise sweeping condem-
2. P. 60.
3. Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973) (construing MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 38 (Michic/Law. Co-op 1968)).
4. We can reasonably claim that we have avoided convictions of persons who are
incontestably not guilty, the "wrong man," as much as we practicably can. Appalling
as such occurrences are, they are very rare and almost always attributable to a
nonsystemic fault peculiar to the case, like malicious abuse of the process or a
coincidence against which we cannot effectively guard.
Pp. 4-5.
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nation. I would have thought that there is more than a little to be
said for a process that hardly ever convicts an innocent defendant but
nonetheless manages to keep the prisons of the country full to the
bursting point, whatever its faults in other respects. I wonder if coun-
tries that rely on Continental, nonadversarial procedures are in so
fortunate a position.
Even if Weinreb's highly critical assessment of the American crim-
inal justice system were entirely justified, he would still have failed
to establish that the faults of our system are the result of our refusal
to adopt European models of investigation and trial. To do so he
would have to examine the extent to which the failings of criminal
justice in the United States are also to be found in Great Britain,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand: countries that share with us a
common legal tradition and have in many respects similar institutions.
If these countries have police forces that behave in a reasonably law-
ful and civilized manner, if they can bring cases to trial without
months and years of pointless delay, if they are not forced to rely
on assembly line plea bargaining, and if they hold members of the
Bar to standards of honesty and candor at least as high as those prac-
ticed by encyclopedia salesmen, then perhaps our faults flow from
something other than our failure to imitate the institutions of France.
Unless this comprehensive comparison is made, it is impossible to be
sure that the glaring defects of American criminal process are not
better explained by such factors as our ethnic and racial differences,
the traditional lawlessness of our people and our officials, and our
insistence on using the criminal law to combat every form of socially
disapproved conduct. A change in the form of our institutions is not
going to help anything very much if the real problem is one of
cultural traditions and unrealistic objectives.
The third major problem with Denial of Justice is that Weinreb
freely engages in the practice of comparing the sordid reality of one
country with an idealized description of another5 When writing
about American criminal process Weinreb stresses the negative to
the point of being unfair. When discussing his proposed Continental
alternative, however, Weinreb scarcely hints that inquisitorial pro-
cedures may have some defects of their own and may not perform
as they were intended due to the inevitable corruption, arrogance,
and inefficiency of officials. An example is the danger that investi-
gating magistrates charged with solving crimes might develop a pros-
5. For an investigation into how Continental criminal systems function, see A. Gold-
stein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems:
France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977).
410
Vol. 87: 406, 1977
Importing Justice
ecutorial bias and not be as neutral and disinterested as they ought
to be. Weinreb momentarily takes note of this possibility: "Experi-
ence in other countries suggests that while prosecutorial bias is not
an inevitable feature of an investigating magistracy, it ought to be
taken seriously into account."6 But the point is then dismissed with
his observation that, in any event, the magistracy would certainly be
more neutral than the police. This is hardly reassuring, since Weinreb
proposes to give his magistrates far greater authority than we have
ever been willing to entrust to the police. One would like to have
some elaboration of the experience in European countries that demon-
strates that magistrate bias is a problem that ought to be taken
seriously into account. Again, Weinreb casually states that magistrates
could complete investigations of most crimes in a day or two.7 He
does not tell us whether countries such as France and Italy, which
follow the kind of system he advocates, in fact do succeed in meeting
such a rigorous time schedule. Of course they do not. It is true around
the world that governmental bodies move more slowly in practice
than they do in theory.
Even if Weinreb could prove that the French system actually works
better in France than the Anglo-American system works in the United
States, he would still be a long way from proving that we can solve
any of our problems by importing French institutions. There is simply
no reason to believe that those institutions would work for us as they
do for the French, or that we would not soon succeed in perverting
them as thoroughly as we have perverted our own. At an early point
in the book Weinreb articulates this insight, as he observes that French
criminal procedure "is profoundly affected by the concept of L'Etat,
the State, as an entity whose authority is not to be questioned,",, a
concept that he recognizes is as foreign to us as eating snails. He then
acknowledges that French procedures "would not work out in the
same way in this country, where 'the authority of the state' is not a




9. Id. Indeed, Weinreb explicitly disclaims reliance on foreign experience as a motive
for his proposals.
"Continental" criminal procedure provided a direction for my thinking; in par-
ticular, the opportunity several years ago to observe closely all aspects of French
criminal process helped me to visualize possibilities unlike those with which I was
familiar. The reason for adopting a model like the one I have outlined, however,
is not that something similar has worked acceptably elsewhere, but that that is
where our own principles and experience lead.
P. X.
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he thereafter ignores it and proceeds to argue that we should adopt
institutions borrowed from the French, without discussing ,how pre-
vailing American cultural attitudes and traditions might affect the
performance of those institutions. But the point illuminates a fun-
damental flaw in Weinreb's whole approach to comparative criminal
procedure, and it cannot be dismissed with an offhand concession.
As Mirjan Damaska explained in a penetrating article in this law
journal, 10 European and Anglo-American attitudes toward authority
and structures of government differ profoundly in ways that have the
greatest significance in shaping legal institutions and practices. Euro-
peans tend to value theory, hierarchical organization, and central au-
thority; we stress pragmatism, checks and balances, and decentraliza-
tion. As Damaska explains, the basic differences in the criminal justice
systems reflect these underlying societal values." Given these differ-
ences in philosophy, there is simply no way that the institutions of
one system can be transported to the other without undergoing pro-
found and possibly self-defeating change.
As an example consider the office of investigating magistrate, the
creation of which is the principal proposal of Weinreb's book. Wein-
reb explains hardly anything about this official other than that he
will be neutral and disinterested and that he will have the authority
to conduct investigations and question witnesses, including the de-
fendant. He does not describe how such a class of Mandarins is to be
recruited, appointed, trained, or supervised, except to say that the
magistracy would be a "legal career" with "specialized preparation."' 12
This is a serious omission, because the term "magistrate" has a quite
different meaning in France than in this country. Our magistrates
are typically either elected or appointed through a process of political
patronage, and they are not necessarily lawyers. Like other judges
they are not members of any bureaucratic hierarchy, and they do
pretty much as they please subject only to the sanction of reversal.
If officials of this sort were to undertake the principal responsibility
for the investigation of crime, the results would be ludicrous. Every
magistrate would have a different idea of what was important, none
would have any significant investigatory training, and no one would
be responsible for setting policy, disciplining the incompetent, or pro-
moting the proficient.
10. Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE
L.J. 480 (1975).
11. See id. at 532-39 (discussing affinity between theory of classic English liberalism
and Anglo-American criminal procedure).
12. P. 145.
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Obviously Weinreb has something very different from an American
municipal court judge in mind when he writes of an "investigating
magistrate," but he leaves it to the reader to guess just what he does
intend. In fact, the American official most nearly comparable to his
investigating magistrate is not any of our judges, but rather the United
States Attorney. The United States Attorney's principal function is
not appearing in court as an advocate, but rather investigating crime
with the aid of the F.B.I. and the grand jury and determining who
is to be prosecuted. The United States Attorney does have the au-
thority to question witnesses and prospective defendants by invoking
the grand jury process; he is not a local cop with general peace-
keeping functions; and, in theory at least, he is supposed to be as
concerned with protecting the rights of the innocent as convicting
the guilty. He is subject to supervision in everything he does from
his superiors in Washington, who can overrule or supersede him at
any point. He is not "neutral or disinterested" but neither is an in-
vestigating magistrate who, unlike an American judge, has a respon-
sibility to solve crimes and uncover evidence of guilt. When Weinreb
speaks of an investigating magistrate he is describing an official who
has rather more in common with an American prosecutor than with
an American judge. 13
Whatever the title of the investigator, he would of course be an
American sharing the attitudes and prejudices of his countrymen. He
would not be perceived as "neutral" or "disinterested" by the de-
fendant or defense lawyer because he would represent the authority
of the state, and we perceive the criminal process as a contest between
the individual and the state. He would be tempted to take short cuts
and abridge rights to satisfy the public demand that he solve crimes
and see to it that the guilty are punished. Defendants would con-
stantly try to hamstring him with time-consuming motions and hear-
ings, and they would sometimes obtain support from higher court
judges who are themselves former practicing lawyers distrustful of
governmental authority. The political and cultural conflicts that have
made our criminal process what it is would not go away, and they
would go to work to transform the alien system.
There are many things to be learned from the study of foreign
methods and institutions, but one of them is not that we can discard
our own traditions and make a fresh start with borrowed ideas. There
is always a value in perspective, in seeing that other people are able
13. In Germany, the public prosecutor conducts the pretrial investigation, and
Germans apparently find this system quite satisfactory.
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to do very well without some things that seem indispensable to us.
If we study the practices of other countries, rather than their pre-
tenses, we may also take comfort in the fact that denial of justice
is a part of the human condition everywhere, and if some countries
seem to be better at dealing with it than we are there are many
others that are still worse. Perhaps we should marvel that our crim-
inal justice system manages to work even as well as it does, given
the enormous amount of crime it is expected to deal with and the
hopelessly conflicting objectives with which it is saddled. We cannot
realistically expect our narcotics detectives both to succeed in sup-
pressing the heroin traffic and to avoid making searches that a judge
on subsequent reflection might consider to be based on unreasonable
suspicions. We cannot expect to conduct trials promptly and effi-
ciently as long as we give criminal defendants so many legally pro-
tected rights, including the right to inquire at length into the legality
of every aspect of the criminal investigation. Our problems are largely
home grown; they result both from the conflicting demands we place
on the criminal justice system and from our conflicting attitudes about
governmental authority. We can no more import our solutions than
we can export our problems.
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Taking Rights Seriously. By Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977. Pp. xv, 293. $12.00.
Reviewed by David Lyonst
A complete theory of law, writes Ronald Dworkin, tells us what
law is and what it ought to be. The current "ruling" theory of law
combines legal positivism with utilitarianism: it holds, first, that law
is a set of explicitly adopted rules and, second, that law ought to
maximize the general welfare. 1 Dworkin rejects both branches of
that theory. He argues that law contains "principles" as well as rules
and that these principles cannot be traced to any explicit adoption
or enactment. Dworkin argues further that the ruling theory neglects
moral rights, which must be respected, he claims, even if they do
not promote the general welfare.2 Dworkin then offers an alterna-
tive theory of law, founded on the right to be treated as an equal.
Taking Rights Seriously presents these views by collecting many
of Dworkin's provocative and valuable essays.3 It is a rare treat-im-
portant, original philosophy that is also a pleasure to read. Dworkin
argues vigorously, imaginatively, and elegantly.4 His book encompasses
a wide range of topics, as well as some shifts in doctrine, but still it
hangs together well. The more topical essays (on the Nixon Court,
civil disobedience, and reverse discrimination) employ and develop
philosophical ideas found in the more abstract theoretical papers.
But the heart of Dworkin's book is his abstract legal theory, and
I shall concentrate on that here. His critique of legal positivism (the
* I would like to thank Richard Miller, Samuel Scheffler, and Robert Summers for
their helpful comments on earlier versions of this review, and Ronald Dworkin for
providing proofs before publication of his two most recent articles.
t Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University.
I. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY vii (1977) [hereinafter cited by page number
only].
2. P. xi.
3. Dworkin's other published work in this area includes Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REV.
1201 (1977); No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 58 (P. Hacker & J. Raz
eds. 1977); Philosophy and the Critique of Law, in THE RULE OF LAw 147 (R. Wolff ed.
1971); and Judicial Discretion. 60 J. PHILOSOPHY 624 (1963).
4. Dworkin uses philosophical machinery very efficiently. His essay Constitutional
Cases, at pp. 131-49, is a particularly good example.
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"descriptive" aspect of the ruling theory of law) is a substantial part
of the book. It is well known and widely accepted and is apparently
the motivating basis for developing an alternative theory of law; so
it will receive most of my attention. I will then consider briefly
Dworkin's own theory. But first we should review the doctrines of
two outstanding legal philosophers, John Austin and H.L.A. Hart-
Hart because Dworkin treats his theory as the high point of posi-
tivism and Austin because Hart's ideas emerge primarily from a cri-
tique of Austin's classical version of legal positivism.
I. Classical and Contemporary Positivism
Austin's theory of law is set within a theory about the various norms
that govern human conduct.5 Some rules are set for humans by God:
this is "divine law." Others are made by humans for each other: these
include "positive law" (what we ordinarily call "law") and "positive
morality" (all other human standards, ranging from etiquette and cus-
tom to conventional morality).
Austin conceives of positive law as general commands, enforced by
the threat of punishment for disobedience, that are traceable to a
"sovereign"-some person or set of persons whom the bulk of the
community habitually obeys and who does not habitually obey any
other human. Most of positive morality, by contrast, is not consciously
set by particular persons or backed by threats of formal sanctions, but
consists rather of norms that prevail informally within the community
and that are supported by social pressures. Law is thus different from,
though it can overlap in content with, positive morality.
Divine law is Austin's notion of principles that are not merely ac-
cepted, but are morally valid and binding. It corresponds to Hart's
notion of "critical morality," or "the general moral principles used
in the criticism of actual social institutions including positive moral-
ity."6 We have little evidence of God's commands, but Austin reasons
that, since God is benevolent, "general utility" is a guide to them.
7
Austin thus emerges as a utilitarian and appears to embrace the full
ruling theory of law described by Dworkin.
Hart, who is not a utilitarian, defends positivism,8 but nevertheless
5. See generally J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 9-33, 118-361
(H.L.A. Hart ed. 1955).
6. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 20 (1966).
7. J. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 34-38, 127-29.
8. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV.
593 (1958).
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rejects Austin's conception of law. 9 The idea that laws are a sovereign's
orders backed by threats misrepresents even what Hart calls "primary"
rules of law, those rules that impose obligations and that are the
basis for Austin's analysis. More important, Austin's conception ob-
scures "secondary" rules, which do not purport to lay down obliga-
tions but are designed to confer on individuals the power to make
their own legally enforceable arrangements, such as contracts and
wills. Further, laws cannot be validated by tracing them back to is-
suance by a sovereign. We must refer instead, in Hart's view, to those
secondary rules that define public offices and confer legal powers on
their occupants, if we are to distinguish the official from the private
acts of those individuals. Such secondary rules are an essential ele-
ment of legal systems and are ignored by Austin's analysis.
A legal rule exists, Hart says, when it satisfies the criteria of legal
validity used in a legal system, criteria that could be stated in a "rule
of recognition." These are the criteria that are actually accepted and
employed by officials of the system. Legal rules, unlike other social
rules, need not be generally accepted in order to be valid, but in a
real legal system they are generally obeyed.10
Why should we group Austin and Hart together as "legal posi-
tivists"? Hart answers this question, in effect, by listing three doc-
trines of the classical positivists and noting his corresponding views.
First, "laws are commands of human beings"; second, "there is no
necessary connexion between law and morals, or law as it is and law
as it ought to be"; and third, "the analysis or study of meanings of
legal concepts is an important study to be distinguished from (though
in no way hostile to) historical inquiries, sociological inquiries, and
the critical appraisal of law in terms of morals, social aims, functions,
&c." 11 Hart rejects the first of these doctrines but accepts the second
and the third. The second is especially relevant here, and it needs
some elaboration.
Positivists maintain that law is distinguishable from other social
standards, including etiquette and conventional morality. The laws
and mores of a community overlap and influence each other, but they
are not the same thing. (That they influence each other entails that
they are not one and the same.) Positivists also accept the truism
that law can be good or bad, wise or foolish, just or unjust. It is not
necessary, in particular, that any moral condition be satisfied in order
9. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 18-76 (1961).
10. Id. at 77-120.
11. Id. at 253.
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that something qualify as valid law. It is therefore initially an open
question whether one should obey a particular law, that is, whether
an act that is legally required or prohibited should actually be done
or omitted. Given further information, one might answer that ques-
tion, perhaps quite readily. But the question is not an empty one,
because the validity of a law is logically independent of its morality.
The criteria of validity of a legal system may, but need not, incor-
porate a moral test. The morality involved here is not positive or
conventional morality, but critical morality, that is, moral judgments
that are binding by virtue of their supposed correctness.
II. Dworkin's Critique of Legal Positivism
Dworkin's own definition of positivism sets the stage for his cri-
tique. It goes far beyond the points listed by Hart and may be sum-
marized as follows. First, the law of a community consists of standards
that "can be identified and distinguished by specific criteria, by tests
having to do not with their content but with their pedigree or the
manner in which they were adopted or developed." Second, legal
standards are "rules" (thus Dworkin's tag "the model of rules").
Third, because of vagueness or ambiguity in rules and gaps or con-
flicts between them, there are some cases in which the law has no
determinate application. These cases can therefore be decided only
if judges make new law (by exercising "judicial discretion"). Fourth,
legal rights and duties are laid down by legal rules, so that when rules
have no determinate application, there are no preexisting rights or
duties to be enforced.' 2
Dworkin's critique of positivism rests on a distinction between legal
"rules" and legal "principles." "Rules," Dworkin writes, "are appli-
cable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are
given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it sup-
plies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes noth-
ing to the decision."' 3 Rules thus conclusively dispose of cases to which
they apply. A conflict between two rules is a logical anomaly that
must be rectified by modifying or invalidating at least one of the
rules. Principles, by contrast, do not conclusively dispose of cases to
which they apply. They function rather as reasons for deciding cases
one way or another-reasons that can be overridden in a particular
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which either dispose of a case conclusively or are irrelevant to its
disposition, principles have the property of "weight." Thus conflicts
between principles are not logical anomalies, but are occasions for
weighing the relevant principles against each other.
Dworkin illustrates the distinction between rules and principles
with examples drawn from a few famous cases. One is the case of Riggs
v. Palmer,14 in which a boy murdered his grandfather in order to in-
herit immediately under the latter's will. The statute of wills, literally
construed, would have allowed the murderer to inherit, as the court
recognized. But the court denied him the inheritance, reasoning that
all laws, as well as all contracts, may be controlled in their op-
eration and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the common
law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to
take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his
own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.'-
Riggs was thus decided by the principle that no one may profit from
his own wrong.
The principle that was decisive in Riggs was said to be drawn from
the common law. But principles need not have been so recognized in
order to play a role in judicial decisions. In Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc.,' 6 for example, the court declined to enforce a con-
tract limiting the liability of an automobile manufacturer for defec-
tive products. The following was included among the court's con-
siderations:
In a society such as ours, where the automobile is a common and
necessary adjunct of daily life, and where its use is so fraught
with danger to the driver, passengers and the public, the manu-
facturer is under a special obligation in connection with the con-
struct'on, promotion and sale of his cars. Consequently, the courts
must examine purchase agreements closely to see if consumer and
public interests are treated fairly.'7
No such specific obligation had traditionally been recognized at com-
mon law. Yet the principle underlying it was influential in the court's
decision.
The decisive considerations in Riggs and Henningsen were prin-
ciples, not rules. In Riggs, the principle that no man may profit from
14. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
15. Id. at 511, 22 N.E. at 190.
16. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
17. Id. at 387, 161 A.2d at 85.
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his own wrong was weighed against considerations favoring the literal
interpretation of statutes and was deemed to weigh more. In Henning-
sen, the principle that automobile manufacturers have a special ob-
ligation was likewise weighed against considerations favoring the lit-
eral interpretation of contracts. But the decisions in Riggs and Hen-
ningsen did not discredit or require modifications in the principles
that statutes and contracts should be literally construed. In other
cases, these principles may prevail over contrary considerations, with-
out requiring that the weaker principles be qualified or invalidated.
Dworkin uses this distinction between rules and principles to launch
a two-pronged attack on positivism. By concentrating on rules to the
exclusion of principles, Dworkin claims, positivism ignores the im-
pact of principles on the decision even of cases in which the relevant
rules are clear and, further, exaggerates the role of judicial discretion
in cases in which the relevant rules are not clear.
Dworkin may be understood to establish his first point as follows.
Judicial reasoning of the sort used in Riggs and Henningsen, in which
established legal rules are qualified by invoking considerations of
morality and justice, is regarded as appropriate by judges and lawyers.
There may be disagreement about when courts should depart from
clear rules in the light of such principles, but the reasons advanced
for doing so are not dismissed as legally irrelevant. Indeed, failure
to take such factors into account, especially when they are brought
forward by counsel, would often be regarded as judicial oversight
or error. Such principles may not determine a particular decision,
but they can be expected to have some influence, and they may not
be ignored. In this sense, we can say that principles are binding on
judicial decisions.
Furthermore, judges and lawyers in the normal course of their prac-
tice think of judicial reasoning like this as a process of discovering
what the law has to say about particular cases, not as a way of making
new law. Of course, theorists may describe what happens as the mak-
ing, rather than the finding, of law. But before we set out to con-
struct theories about the law, we regard these cases in the opposite
way. So long as such a pretheoretical notion is coherent and tenable,
we need no justification for retaining it. We need justification rather
for discounting a pretheoretical notion in favor of a theory. Until we
find difficulties with the notion that law is being found rather than
made in such cases as Riggs and Henningsen, we should proceed on
that assumption and seek to understand what then goes on. The bur-
den of proof lies on one who would deny it.
But Dworkin does not fault positivism so simply. He also claims
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that there is a connection between positivism's neglect of principles
and its doctrine of judicial discretion. Dworkin may be understood
to reason as follows. If the law contained rules but not principles,
as Dworkin understands positivism to hold, then judicial discretion
would be exercised in deciding cases in which the relevant rules did
not yield a determinate result. But principles supplement rules; they
provide guidance for judicial decision; and they are available to elim-
inate indeterminacies. A theory that ignores principles will accord-
ingly imagine that the law is indeterminate when it is not and that
judges have occasion to make law when they do not. Positivists can
thus be expected to exaggerate the extent of judicial discretion.
Indeed, Dworkin claims not only that principles eliminate some in-
determinacies in the law. He claims, in effect, that principles eliminate
all indeterminacies, for he rejects entirely the idea of judicial discretion.
He assumes that anyone who accepts that idea does so either because
he refuses to acknowledge the existence of legal principles at all or
because he mistakenly believes that principles cannot eliminate in-
determinacies because they must be weighed against each other.
But Dworkin's assumption is false, and his conclusion that prin-
ciples eliminate all indeterminacies cannot validly be drawn. In order
to eliminate all indeterminacies in the law, principles must cover
all cases that might arise; they must have determinable weights; and
the balancing process, in which principles are weighed against each
other, must never yield an equal weight of principle on either side
of a legal question. But we cannot assume that these conditions are
satisfied.' And so we cannot follow Dworkin in supposing that, by
acknowledging the role of principles, one is committed to deny that
there is judicial discretion.
So Dworkin's attack on the doctrine of judicial discretion fails.
Ironically, this failure has no effect on his critique of positivism: the
issue is a red herring. To be sure, Dworkin defines positivism to in-
clude the doctrine of judicial discretion, and positivists such as Austin
and Hart have in fact embraced that doctrine.' 9 But judicial discre-
tion is of interest to us here only if it is theoretically linked to fun-
damental features of legal positivism and not just historically associated
with that type of theory. Now Dworkin seems to assume that there
is some such link, but he never explains what it is. He may assume
that there is a theoretical connection between the doctrine of judicial
discretion and the doctrine that all legal standards are rules. But that
18. Dworkin concedes this general point in No Right Answer?, supra note 3, at 82-83.
19. See J. Aus-lx, supra note 5, at 191; H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 121-32.
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assumption would be mistaken: one can reject the model of rules,
yet accept the doctrine of judicial discretion; conversely, one can ac-
cept the model of rules, yet reject the doctrine of judicial discretion.
We have already observed that one can acknowledge the existence of
legal principles without believing that such principles eliminate all
indeterminacies in the law and with them any occasion for the exercise
of judicial discretion. Conversely, systems of hard and fast rules can
be complete and internally consistent, yielding determinate answers
to all questions that arise under them.
The doctrine of judicial discretion aside, Dworkin's persisting point
against positivism appears to be that it refuses to acknowledge a class
of legal standards, which he calls principles. Our question, then, is
why it should be thought that positivism excludes principles-why, in
other words, positivism is committed to the model of rules. To be
sure, Dworkin defines positivism to embrace the model of rules. But
Dworkin does not explain the connection; he simply takes it for
granted. There is, moreover, no clear evidence in the positivist litera-
ture that legal standards are conceived of as rules in Dworkin's special
sense of that term.
The asserted commitment of positivism to the model of rules might
be founded on the first point in Dworkin's definition of positivism,
which holds that legal standards "can be identified and distinguished
by specific criteria, by tests having to do not with their content but
with their pedigree or the manner in which they were adopted or de-
veloped." 20 Unfortunately, Dworkin never clarifies these metaphoric
terms. One might suppose, however, that they are intended to convey
the idea that nothing is law unless it has been laid down by legislation,
judicial decision, administrative ruling, executive order, or the like.
But there is no reason to think that the adoption of legal standards
by such means results only in rules (standards that apply in an all-
or-nothing fashion) and never in principles (standards that guide,
without determining, legal decisions). Lawmakers are capable of in-
structing other officials to take certain considerations into account,
without requiring that those considerations conclusively determine
decisions.
Dworkin actually gives two accounts of principles. One is the logical
account mentioned above: principles are standards that guide, but
may not determine, legal decisions. Another is a normative account:
principles (in the sense used in Dworkin's critique of positivism)
include both statements of social goals and requirements "of justice
20. P. 17.
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or fairness or some other dimension of morality." 21 Unfortunately,
Dworkin's two accounts of principles do not mesh. Standards with
the logical properties of principles need not be normative standards;
conversely, normative standards need not have the logical properties
of principles. Dworkin in effect concedes the latter point when he
recognizes rights that are "absolute" and overriding.22
Be that as it may, we should ask whether there is any reason to
suppose that adoption or enactment of legal standards cannot yield
principles in the normative sense, as well as rules. But this suggestion
is implausible, for legal standards are often adopted precisely because
they reflect social goals or moral convictions.
We must therefore seek some other explanation for Dworkin's at-
tribution of the model of rules to positivism. He might be understood
to argue that principles, as he defines them, become part of the law in
ways that positivists cannot acknowledge. For Dworkin's own idea is
that judges regard as embedded in the law those principles that justify
past judicial decisions, statutes, and constitutional arrangements. Such
principles need not be laid down as law by any sort of adoption or
enactment. They become law by virtue of their role in justifying past
decisions.
One problem with a critique of positivism based on such a claim
is that it turns crucially on Dworkin's own controversial contention
that judges regard as embedded in the law those principles that per-
form a justificatory function independent of any explicit adoption or
enactment. But Dworkin's critique faces a much more serious obstacle:
it turns upon a fundamental misconception of legal positivism, name-
ly, that the positivists' use of "pedigree" as a test for legal standards
excludes tests of "content." This misconception emerges clearly in
Dworkin's discussion of Hart.
Hart claims that we can think of every legal system as having a
"rule of recognition," which, if it were formulated, would state the
ultimate criteria that officials actually use in validating legal stan-
dards. Such criteria can vary from one system to another, as well as
over time, and Hart envisages a wide range of possible tests, from an
"authoritative list or text" to "some general characteristic" that laws
might be required to have; from enactment "by a specific body," to
"long customary practice," to some "relation to judicial decisions." 3
Hart seems to place no limits on the sort of test that might be em-
21. P. 22.
22. P. 92.
23. H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 92.
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ployed by officials, and the reason is simple: unlike other legal rules,
the rule of recognition may be said to exist only by virtue of the
actual practice of officials. Nothing else determines the content of this
rule. The tests for law in a system are whatever officials make them
-and Hart suggests no limits on the possibilities.
In Hart's view, then, the identification of law turns upon certain
social facts, namely, facts about the practice of officials. Since there
are no limits on the sort of test that might be used by officials, there
are no moral conditions that legal standards must meet in order to
be valid. Hart's first point corresponds to the tenet of positivist theory
generally that law is distinguishable from other social standards: un-
less a standard passes the tests accepted by officials, it is not law-
not even if it is deeply rooted in the customs or moral convictions
of the community and has been used to justify existing law. Hart's
second point corresponds to the positivist idea that law is independent
of critical morality: standards so validated by officials need not satisfy,
or include, any particular moral principles. Hart's theory of law is
thus in keeping with traditional doctrines of positivism. It is a suitable
subject for Dworkin's appraisal.
Dworkin reads Hart's theory more narrowly. He believes that a rule
of recognition is expected to specify features of legal rules by which
such rules can be conclusively validated.2 4 This requirement of con-
clusiveness would exclude the sort of reasoning that Dworkin claims
one uses to find principles embedded in the law. "We argue [that
some principle is a principle of law]," Dworkin writes, "by grappling
with a whole set of shifting, developing and interacting standards
(themselves principles rather than rules) about institutional respon-
sibility, statutory interpretation, the persuasive force of various sorts
of precedent, the relation of all these to contemporary moral prac-
tices, and hosts of other such standards." - 5 These arguments are logi-
cally respectable, but they are not conclusive.
I believe that Dworkin misreads Hart. The passage he relies on
deals specifically with the imaginary transformation of a "prelegal"
community into one with law. At first there is no authoritative test
for rules, so they can exist only by general acceptance, and the system
suffers from the defect of uncertainty. The introduction of a public
test for identifying rules eliminates uncertainty about them. Hart's
language emphasizes the elimination of uncertainty; elsewhere he does
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But suppose I am wrong about Hart's meaning and that Dworkin
is more nearly right. Suppose that Hart really wishes to restrict the
tests that could be incorporated into a rule of recognition and, spe-
cifically, to exclude tests based on judicial reasoning of the sort that
Dworkin describes. This restriction would have no bearing on posi-
tivism as a type of legal theory. Such restrictions on the rule of
recognition would not be a natural outgrowth of, but rather an ar-
bitrary limitation upon, the underlying positivist idea that law is de-
termined by social facts, such as the facts of official practice. I shall
therefore continue to interpret Hart in accordance with this tenet of
positivism.
Dworkin's error can be understood as follows. He sees correctly that
positivists regard social facts, such as the facts of official practice, as
the ultimate determinants of law. He then assumes that positivists
would restrict officials, in deciding upon the authoritative tests for
law, to criteria that themselves incorporate such social facts about ac-
cepted practices. (This assumption is clearly suggested by Dworkin's
notion that positivists are preoccupied with the "pedigree" of legal
standards and consequently are blind to tests based on "content.")
That may be true of Austin, but it is not true of Hart, nor is it essen-
tial to the tradition. In Hart's theory, the social facts that ultimately
determine law are facts about official practice, but the tests for law
are whatever officials make them.
Consider this possibility. In a particular system, officials determine
the validity of putative rules by considering their compatibility with
the provisions of a certain document. This document requires in-
terpretation, and some of its parts are understood in moral terms,
such as fairness or equality. It is standard practice for officials to en-
gage in moral reasoning when interpreting these parts of the docu-
ment and thus when determining what is to count as law. This rea-
soning involves the sensitive identification and weighing of diverse
considerations. The resulting arguments are not logically conclusive,
for that is not their nature; but they can be logically respectable.
The possibility just described is perfectly compatible with Hart's
theory of law. It is also one of the features that Dworkin sees in our
own legal system. He says that the due process and equal protection
clauses of our Constitution are understood to incorporate moral con-
cepts of fairness and equality, which require interpretation in the
form of more specific substantive principles. Judges cannot defend




The Yale Law Journal
Dworkin's definition of positivism, then, is misleading. Positivists
do not hold that law must be identified by tests of "pedigree" and
not by tests of "content." They hold, rather, that it is not necessarily
the case that a rule must satisfy particular moral standards in order
to count as law. But the fact that qualification by virtue of "content"
need not occur in legal systems does not imply that it can not occur.
If Dworkin is to refute positivism, he must show either that an ac-
tual or possible system of law has features that are incompatible with
the picture presented by that theory, or that any system of law has
features that positivism neglects. Although Dworkin sometimes seems
to be trying to show one of these two things, it is clear at the end
that his criticisms fail to show either one. His description of our leg-al
system has no implications for legal systems in general, and, as .we
have seen, it is compatible with the positivist account.
Sometimes, however, Dworkin suggests a milder criticism of legal
positivism-not that its picture is false, but that it is incomplete. Posi-
tivists fail to explain certain facts about our system, including the
supposed fact that "hard" cases are decided on the basis of preexisting
law. Further, they fail to formulate and endorse an approach to de-
ciding hard cases. The latter observation may well be true, even if
it may not reasonably be taken as a criticism of positivism, since that
may not be what positivism tries to do. Dworkin's own theory of law,
at any rate, is meant to fill this gap-to provide a systematic and il-
luminating account of the way in which "hard" cases are and ought
to be decided. Let us turn to that theory now.
III. The Rights Thesis and Its Ramifications
Like the ruling theory of law, Dworkin's theory has both a descrip-
tive aspect, which concerns what law is, and a normative aspect, which
concerns what the law ought to be. This is true of his Rights Thesis,
which speaks only of judicial decisions in civil cases; it is also true of
the broader theory that he sketches when he develops and defends
that thesis.
It should be emphasized that Dworkin's theory is not, like positivism,
a general theory about the nature of law. It is quite limited in scope.
The political framework of law that Dworkin describes and endorses
is based on features of our own system and cannot apply to systems
with different features. And, as we shall see, the scope of Dworkin's
theory is also limited by certain moral assumptions.
The Rights Thesis says "that judicial decisions in civil cases, even
in hard cases . . .characteristically are and should be generated by
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principle not policy."'27 The term "principle" is used here in a nar-
row, normative sense, one that Dworkin mentioned but did not use
in his critique of positivism:
Arguments of policy justify a political decision by showing that
the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the com-
munity as a whole. The argument in favor of a subsidy for aircraft
manufacturers, that the subsidy will protect national defense, is
an argument of policy. Arguments of principle justify a political
decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some in-
dividual or group right. The argument in favor of anti-discrimina-
tion statutes, that a minority has a right to equal respect and con-
cern, is an argument of principle.2-8
Principles and policies are "the major grounds of political justifica-
tion."20
Dworkin does not explain what he means by "hard cases." These
might be cases in which the law appears indeterminate, because of
vagueness, conflicting rules, and the like; but Dworkin might also
wish to include cases like Riggs, in which apparently determinate
law is not followed by the courts. Both would be included by saying
that hard cases are those in which the decision goes beyond the
holdings of past cases and beyond the literal import of established
legal rules.
Dworkin does not believe, of course, that in deciding such cases
judges need reach beyond the law. His general idea about hard cases,
as we have seen, is that they can be decided on the basis of existing
law, so long as the law is understood to include more than past hold-
ings and rules explicitly adopted by means such as legislation. This
view of law accords, he believes, with our ordinary notions about
law, free of theoretical speculation. More specifically, Dworkin's idea
is that judicial practice reveals that the law extends beyond past de-
cisions to include the considerations that are needed to justify those
decisions, whether or not those considerations have been adequately
recorded. These considerations are seen as implicit in existing law;
they are treated as already established legal standards. The class of
such considerations would include preeminently principles and poli-
cies. Dworkin develops this idea systematically and in great detail; I
will touch on some of its larger features here.
When judges reason in this way, they are not content to find only
27. P. 84.
28. P. 82; see also p. 22.
29. P. 83.
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those principles or policies that are needed to justify the limited class
of decisions directly relevant to the case at bar. They seek systematic
consistency in their decisions, and so they seek that organized set of
principles and policies that provides the best possible justification
of the maximum number of past decisions plus any other decisions
that they would be prepared to make. Furthermore, these principles
and policies are expected to justify political decisions generally, in-
cluding those reflected in constitutional arrangements, legislation, ex-
ecutive orders, and the like. The principles and policies included in
this set are supposed to express not only the personal convictions of
the judges, but also the convictions of the community as a whole.
When judges decide cases by appealing to such a system of principles
and policies, they invoke what Dworkin calls a "political theory." The
elements of such a theory are accorded the status of law. They are
taken by judges to be embedded in the system and to be preestab-
lished doctrine, enforceable like ordinary rules.
A political theory of this sort must be complex because our system
is complex. Constitutional rules, statutes, case law, and so on, are
organized in a hierarchical structure. Just as legislation must remain
within constitutional limits, so the justification of legislation is limited
by the justification of the constitutional structure. And principles and
policies bear on decisions at every level of this hierarchy. Further,
principles and policies can be ordered in priority with respect to each
other and can also be derived from one another.
Determining the political theory that can be said to underlie our
system in this sense is not a simple matter. One must engage in moral
reasoning and weigh conflicting considerations. Reasonable people
can disagree-though the possibility of disagreement does not show that
there is no single best, and therefore correct, theory.
This view of our system of law assumes that the vast majority of
past political decisions is justified.30 Indeed, Dworkin assumes, more
specifically, that "[t]he constitution sets out a general political scheme
80. The term "justified" is sometimes used in a relatively weak sense, which defines
justification to mean consistency with more basic norms of a system of values. In this
sense one might speak of "justifying" political decisions that discriminate against blacks,
for example, by showing that they serve a racist ideology that is held, on independent
grounds, to be embedded in a political system. Dworkin appears to use the term
"justified" in a stronger sense, which requires that the principles and policies found
embedded in the law themselves be morally defensible. Dworkin's usage is indicated in
several ways. For example, his concern to justify the use of coercion and the imposition
of burdens or deprivation of benefits seems to presuppose the stronger sense of justifi-
cation, as does the fact that the justificatory role of principles and policies is, in Dworkin's
view, the basis for finding them embedded in the law (rather than the other way
around). For confirmation of this interpretation, see Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. L.
Rsv. 1201, 1258 (1977).
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that is sufficiently just to be taken as settled for reasons of fairness." 31
It follows that Dworkin's theory of law, which seeks both to describe
our system and to prescribe for it, does not apply to systems of which
these assumptions cannot be made. I confess that I am less ready than
Dworkin to assume that they are true of our own system.
Dworkin's assumption of the justice of our political structure has
some bearing, I think, on his strategy of argument. He believes that
we must initially accept judges' and lawyers' perceptions of the law,
so long as they are not speculating about it. This approach seems
philosophically impeccable-until we realize that those perceptions
can be distorted by moral interests. Take hard cases, for example.
We are told that judges and lawyers, when they are not burdened
by theories about judicial discretion, think of law as being found,
not made. But it is generally accepted that judicial legislation works
injustice by creating rights and duties ex post facto. Those who are
professionally engaged in the practice and administration of law may
naturally be disinclined to perceive judicial legislation in hard cases,
for they could then be regarded as instruments of injustice. Further,
judges and lawyers can be assumed, in general, to be ideologically as
well as professionally committed to the system under consideration.
Thus we must take their morally shaded perceptions with a grain
of salt, especially if we have some reason to suspect injustice in the
system.
Dworkin's theory explains how precedents can be understood to
have legal implications that go beyond the strict limits of their hold-
ings. It does so by according the status of law to the considerations
that are held to justify judicial precedents, which considerations are
then available in deciding new cases. The Rights Thesis in effect
answers the further question: are these considerations principles or
policies? Dworkin's answer is that those considerations are solely prin-
ciples, and his strategy is to argue that we cannot account for the
extended legal implications of judicial precedents unless we suppose
that they are based only on principles.
Dworkin's argument may be summarized in the following way.
Fairness (and fairness alone) requires that like cases be treated alike
-that new cases be decided like past cases. When hard cases are de-
cided, this similarity of treatment can be achieved only by applying
to the new case the considerations that justify the decisions in past
cases. We might think that these considerations could be either prin-
ciples or policies. But fairness does not require the continued appli-
31. P. 106.
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cation of policies, only the continued application of principles. Thus
the use of one case as precedent for others can only be explained if
we suppose that cases are decided by principle, not policy, since it is
only in the application of principle that fairness requires us to be
consistent. Further, since fairness requires that we treat like cases
alike, and deciding cases by appeal to principles rather than policies
is the only way to do so, judges should do just that.
Dworkin's thesis obviously turns on his argument that fairness can-
not require the continued application of policies. Let us consider
that argument.
When Dworkin considers the possibility that judicial decisions might
be based on policies, or social goals, he assumes that such decisions
would be much like legislation based on the same considerations.
His argument accordingly makes no particular reference to the fair-
ness of judicial decisions based on policies. After considering some
examples of legislation based on policies, he concludes:
There is, perhaps, some limit to the arbitrariness of the distinc-
tions the legislature may make in its pursuit of collective goals.
Even if it is efficient to build all shipyards in southern California,
it might be thought unfair, as well as politically unwise, to do
so. But these weak requirements, which prohibit grossly unfair
distributions, are plainly compatible with providing sizeable in-
cremental benefits to one group that are withheld from others.32
(Dworkin makes a controversial assumption here, namely, that dis-
tributive justice is relatively indulgent. 33 Without that assumption, his
argument collapses.) As Dworkin continues, however, he shifts from
speaking of the legislature to speaking of government in general
(which, of course, includes the courts):
There can be, therefore, no general argument of fairness that a
government which serves a collective goal in one way on one oc-
casion must serve it that way, or even serve the same goal, when-
ever a parallel opportunity arises .... I mean that a responsible
government may serve different goals in a piecemeal and occa-
sional fashion, so that even though it does not regret, but con-
tinues to enforce, one rule designed to serve a particular goal, it
may reject other rules that would serve that same goal just as
well.34
32. P. 114.
33. Taken literally, Dworkin's passage implies that only gross unfairness on the part
of the legislature is morally unacceptable on grounds of fairness. It is not clear that
such a contention is coherent, and so I have interpreted the passage more loosely.
34. P. 114.
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If Dworkin's argument is to succeed, he must establish that, in de-
ciding cases on the basis of policies, judges must have the broad dis-
cretion that he describes here. The question is not whether policies
can bind judges at all, for Dworkin's general description of our sys-
tem implies that they can, and he cannot assume the contrary here.
Rather, the question is whether judges who decide cases on the basis
of policies have the same discretion in their decisions that legislators
have in deciding which policies to embody in legislation. Within
Dworkin's own theory of adjudication, it seems to me to be untenable
to hold that judges are so free to decide which legal standards they
shall apply. Since policies can become binding legal standards (as we
must assume), judges are bound to apply them when they are relevant
and not outweighed by conflicting considerations. It seems, therefore,
that Dworkin cannot, in this respect, assimilate adjudication to legis-
lation.
Dworkin might also be understood to argue that hard cases should
be decided in terms of principle rather than policy because rights are
at issue in those cases. A party to a civil case claims a right based
on existing law, and the right of one party is understood to be vin-
dicated, not created, by the judicial decision. These descriptions are
taken for granted in hard as well as in easy cases. Since principles
are defined in terms of rights, while policies are not, it might seem
that the considerations that can account for the adjudication of rights
in civil cases must be principles. But that would be mistaken.
As Dworkin allows, both principles and policies can argue for rights.
Principles lay down rights directly; policies do not. Policies set out
goals, but these, Dworkin assumes, do not entail any rights. Yet policies
can be used to argue for rights, and legislation based on policies
often creates rights. To use Dworkin's example, if legislation to sub-
sidize aircraft manufacturers is enacted, the manufacturers acquire
certain rights. Policies thus provide arguments for political decisions
that create rights. In this respect, their operation is no different from
the operation of principles in hard cases. For hard cases are those in
which the rights to be enforced are not identical with those enforced
in past cases. One must distinguish, in dealing with hard cases, be-
tween the general considerations used to justify judicial decisions and
the specific results of applying those considerations in particular cases.
When principles are applied, the rights that they assert are more
abstract than the concrete rights that are actually enforced in the case
at hand. Those principles therefore operate, like policies, by pro-
viding reasons for enforcing certain rights in a hard case.
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So the fact that judicial decisions adjudicate rights does not show
that principles alone, and not policies, can account for them. A pos-
sible source of confusion here is the fact that fairness itself can be
thought to involve the right to be treated as well as others have been
treated in the past. But this right should not be confused with an
abstract right that the court may have recognized by invoking it to
decide the earlier case. That an argument of fairness is relevant in
succeeding cases does not at all tend to show that the considerations
on which the initial decision was based themselves concern rights
rather than social goals.
We can also see that this requirement of fairness can be met if
policies, rather than only principles, are applied. This idea of fairness,
that like cases are to be treated alike, requires interpretation. It will
not help to interpret it in terms of enforcing the same rights that
were enforced in past cases, because, as we have seen, the rights en-
forced in hard cases are not the same as those enforced in the relevant
precedents. All we can assume is that the same justifying considerations
are applied. But since policies can serve as justifying considerations
as well as principles can, we cannot infer that only principles may be
applied.
I conclude that the Rights Thesis requires further argument. Wheth-
er it can survive more direct appraisal remains to be seen.35
I would like to turn now to the broader reaches of Dworkin's moral
theory. These emerge partly from his discussion of the specific po-
litical theory that may be said to underlie our political system and
partly from his more abstract philosophical discussions.
Dworkin believes that rights are dominant in the political theory
that can be most strongly defended for our political system in gen-
eral, and not just for our civil law. He therefore rejects the notion
that our system is predicated on the goal of maximizing total welfare.
Generally speaking, if we take rights seriously, we will not allow them
to be infringed in order to promote social goals most efficiently. Rights
thus "trump" ordinary policy arguments. Some rights, such as that of
free speech, are entrenched in our Constitution and confine legisla-
tion at the highest level. But Dworkin does not infer from this en-
trenchment of certain rights that the political theory underlying our
system is a mere amalgam of certain specially protected rights and
the broad social goal of maximizing general utility. He believes, rather,
35. Serious doubts are raised in R. Summers, Two Kinds of Reasons of Substance
in Common Law Cases (unpublished paper read to World Congress on Philosophy of
Law and Social Philosophy, Sydney-Canberra, August 14-21, 1977).
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that both strands of our political morality rest on more fundamental
rights.
Dworkin assumes that the general welfare is served when the ex-
isting preferences of current members of the community are satisfied
to the maximum feasible degree. He assumes, further, that a govern-
ment based on popular election of legislators and interest group
pressures is the political system best calculated to satisfy existing pref-
erences and therefore to serve the general welfare. Such a system is
committed to taking everyone's interests into account and, in this
sense, to giving everyone equal consideration. However, our system
is influenced not just by preferences that people have concerning them-
selves, but also by preferences that people have concerning the way
in which others are to be treated. Racist attitudes are an example:
one might oppose a certain measure more for the benefits it confers
on a certain group than for any burden it imposes on oneself. If these
preferences influence political decisions, then the interests of some
persons will, in effect, be discounted and those of other persons exag-
gerated. That bias violates the right to treatment as an equal (the
right to equal consideration or to equal concern and respect). To
protect that right best, a system designed to serve the general welfare
must be restricted in certain ways. That is the sort of system that we
have-with constitutional limits calculated to protect the right to equal
consideration. This right is then seen to underlie both adherence to
the goal of general utility, up to a certain point, and respect for par-
ticular rights that "trump" the pursuit of general utility.
Dworkin does not merely find this political morality underlying
our system of law-he endorses it. In so doing, Dworkin attacks utili-
tarianism, which takes as the ultimate standard for all choices the
welfare and happiness of people (or, more broadly, all sentient crea-
tures) at large, and which is the normative part of what Dworkin
regards as the ruling theory of law. He may well be right both in
rejecting utilitarianism and in finding a different theory embedded in
our system. The questions that he raises about utilitarianism, con-
cerning rights and equal consideration, are challenging and important.
But his actual reasoning appears inadequate as it stands.
Consider first Dworkin's general conception of utilitarianism. He
defines the general welfare in terms of the existing preferences of
current members of the community. But utilitarians take into account
the interests of all humans (and some would include other animals),
regardless of political boundaries. And, just as they are concerned
about the distant consequences of human behavior, as well as its im-
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mediate effects, utilitarians do not neglect the interests of those who
are as yet unborn. Thus Dworkin's analysis of utilitarianism is far
too narrow.
Secondly, in catering to existing preferences, Dworkin's conception
sacrifices fidelity to the tradition of utilitarianism for the sake of
fashion in welfare economics. In the individual case, welfare cannot
be fully understood in terms of the satisfaction of existing preferences,
for one would often be better off if one's attitudes and interests, and
consequently one's preferences, were changed. Such change is always
possible, to some degree, and its costs may be outweighed by the bene-
fits to be gotten. What is true of the individual seems no less true
of humanity at large. It is plausible to suppose that we would all
be better off if, for example, we were less competitive, less consump-
tion oriented, and free of racist attitudes. It is not unreasonable to
believe that the general welfare would be served by working to change
our preferences rather than by catering to them.
Finally, though Dworkin recognizes that rights can be derived
from certain social goals, he does not consider the possibility seriously
in connection with the goal of promoting welfare. But it is not im-
plausible to suppose, as John Stuart Mill did, that government re-
flecting popular attitudes would best serve the general welfare only
if it were restricted by a system of basic rights.36 The plausibility of
this suggestion increases as we dissociate welfare from existing pref-
erences.
Dworkin's discussion of justification provides a further contrast be-
tween his theory and the utilitarian tradition. In the first stage of
that discussion, we find Dworkin suggesting the idea that a moral
judgment is justified if, and only if, it is supported by those general
considerations that best express the deep, shared convictions within
one's community.3 7 This does not mean that popular attitudes are
self-justifying, for they may not always square with more deeply held
moral convictions. But this idea is nonetheless conventionalistic, since
the fundamental values that can be ascribed to a community as a whole
are not necessarily shared by each member. This theory entails that
one cannot have a justified moral belief that is at variance with
the deeply held morality of the community. Given Dworkin's idea
that the values embedded in law are drawn from the morality of the
community, we are left with the view that the values underlying a
36. For a sketch of Mill's theory, see Lyons, Human Rights and the General Welfare,
6 PHILOSOPHY 9- PUB. AFFAIRS 113 (1977).
37. P. 155. See also Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHILOSOPI-
CAL REv. 177 (1951).
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system of law cannot justifiably be disapproved by a member of the
community in question. If its system of law were based on the goal of
promoting total welfare, for example, one would be obliged to accept
that goal, since any other judgment would be unjustified.
In the second stage of Dworkin's discussion, however, he claims
that the very idea of moral justification assumes the right to treat-
ment as an equal. We cannot even conceive of justification without
committing ourselves to that right, which is then guaranteed a de-
cisive role in any system of values that may be regarded as justified.
This view is less conventionalistic than the first, because it insists
upon the right to treatment as an equal, whether or not that right
is among the deeply held moral tenets of the community. No system
that is not predicated on that right, or at least no system that clashes
with it, can be regarded as justified.
Even this second view of moral justification nevertheless seems sig-
nificantly conventionalistic, since any values that do not clash with
the right to be treated as an equal can be imposed upon dissenters
in the community by virtue of their being generally accepted at a
deep level. In this respect, Dworkin's ideas about justification again
diverge from the utilitarian tradition. Utilitarians try to take a de-
tached moral point of view. Right and wrong are not subordinate in
any systematic way to the moral beliefs that people happen to have.
Moral principles are supposed, within this tradition, to apply uni-
versally. The only principle for which this may be true in Dworkin's
theory is the right to treatment as an equal.
